Reconceptualizing Entrenched Notions of Common Law Property Regimes: Maori Self-determination and Environmental Protection through Legal Personality for Natural Objects by Williams, Bridget
Buffalo Environmental Law Journal 
Volume 26 Number 1 Article 5 
8-1-2019 
Reconceptualizing Entrenched Notions of Common Law Property 
Regimes: Maori Self-determination and Environmental Protection 
through Legal Personality for Natural Objects 
Bridget Williams 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj 
 Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Property 
Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bridget Williams, Reconceptualizing Entrenched Notions of Common Law Property Regimes: Maori Self-
determination and Environmental Protection through Legal Personality for Natural Objects, 26 Buff. Envtl. 
L.J. 157 (2019). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/belj/vol26/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Environmental Law Journal by an authorized 
editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
157 
 
 
 
RECONCEPTUALIZING ENTRENCHED NOTIONS OF 
COMMON LAW PROPERTY REGIMES: MĀORI SELF-
DETERMINATION AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
THROUGH LEGAL PERSONALITY FOR NATURAL OBJECTS 
 
Bridget Williams 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The concept of legal personality for land and natural objects 
addresses many points of difference between English common law 
concepts of property and Māori notions of kinship with and 
stewardship of ancestral lands. The two major implementations of this 
concept in Aotearoa1 New Zealand have involved the Whanganui 
River/Te Awa Tupua Act and the Te Urewera National Park/Te 
Urewera Act. This paper will consider where these recent attempts to 
formalize legal personalities and the resulting legislative actions have 
been successful in bridging gaps in the two conflicting property 
regimes – English and Māori – and where they have further to go. It 
argues that while the Acts were undertaken as a concession to Māori, 
there will be long-term benefits for all Aotearoa New Zealanders in 
that these reconceptualizations of property rights provide much 
stronger protections for the natural environment, an area where the 
common law tradition of property ownership has major weaknesses. 
Part I of the paper begins with a brief introduction to the 
history of property law in Aotearoa New Zealand, including how the 
infliction of settler-colonial common law concepts shaped the 
landscape and title-driven property system. Part II provides an 
overview of the source of seeming incompatibility of English 
common law property law and Māori land relations, focusing on the 
concepts of rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga. Part III briefly covers 
the origins and goals of the personhood movement, which was started 
                                                 
1 Aotearoa, MAORI.COM, https://www.maori.com/aotearoa (last visited Apr. 20, 
2018) (“Aotearoa is the Māori name for the country of New Zealand. The literal 
translation of Aotearoa is ‘land of the long white cloud.’”). 
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in the 1970s by American law professor Christopher Stone. This part 
also includes overviews of the two implementations of the model in 
Aotearoa New Zealand thus far – Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua – 
including their respective explicit fundamental objectives and 
practical methods of implementation. 
Part IV of the paper focuses on the specific areas where the 
personhood implementations have validated Māori cosmologies, and 
where similar types of legislation may solve problems which exist 
precisely because of long-standing common law property systems. 
Part V focuses on potential long-term benefits from these Acts in 
terms of environmental protection and how they address areas where 
English common law is particularly weak.  
 
I. INTRODUCTION OF SETTLER-COLONIAL COMMON LAW 
PROPERTY REGIMES INTO AOTEAROA NEW ZEALAND 
 
Aotearoa New Zealand settler-colonists brought with them a 
British-influenced, common law property system and an 
anthropocentric approach to property. The overarching theme under 
this common law system is that land is owned, and it is owned by 
individuals. In many countries that were colonized by the British, the 
relationship between the indigenous population and the land was 
never recognized, and the land was simply “taken” by the settler-
colonists and colonial governments. The indigenous peoples of 
Aotearoa New Zealand, whose relationship to the land will be one 
focus of this paper, are commonly known as Māori.2 
Compared to the British approach in other colonies, the 
settler-colonial government in Aotearoa New Zealand actually 
recognized Māori ownership, and required that native title be 
extinguished before land could be transferred to individual owners. In 
the early days of settlement, this was accomplished by large-scale pre-
emptive land sales (some say confiscations) by the Crown, followed 
                                                 
2 See Jessica C. Lai, Māori Culture in the Modern World: Its Creation, 
Appropriation and Trade (Int’l Comm. & Art L. Lucerne, Working Paper No. 2, 
2010). 
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by allocation to local governments for parceling out.3 This process 
extinguished the customary title, also known as native title or “right 
of occupancy,”4 of huge swaths of land. It is important to understand 
that Māori, at this time, had no concept of absolute ownership of land, 
and the idea of exclusion and boundaries was very rare.5 This initial 
interaction between settler-colonial and native indigenous 
perspectives on land provides the perfect illustration for friction to 
come. Māori “sellers” believed that the settler-colonial “buyers” were 
simply making a gift to them in order to live and share the land with 
them.6 In fact, they could not have intended to completely alienate the 
land, because this concept would have been foreign to them. 
This large-scale process of stripping (what would later be 
known as) customary title was then replaced by the Native Lands Act 
of 1862. This Act allowed Māori to convert land held by customary 
title into “Crown-sanctioned” ownership. The resulting parcels are 
known as Māori freehold land and remain under the jurisdiction of 
the Māori Land Court, which was created by the Native Land Act in 
1865.7 The Māori Land Court is responsible for oversight of Māori 
freehold land, including its “status, ownership, management, and 
use.”8 Once converted into Māori freehold, the land could be 
alienated in ways that Māori chose,9 albeit under the watchful eye of 
the Māori Land Court. This process allowed for Māori to bring land 
                                                 
3 See Richard P. Boast, Recognizing Multi-Textualism: Rethinking New Zealand’s 
Legal History, 37 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 547, 577 (2006). 
4 PARLIAMENTARY LIBRARY, BACKGROUND NOTE: THE FORESHORE AND SEABED: 
MAORI CUSTOMARY RIGHTS AND SOME LEGAL ISSUES (2003). 
5 See Māori and Land Ownership, TE ARA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW ZEALAND, 
https://teara.govt.nz/en/land-ownership/page-1 (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
6 Anna Shackell, Ownership, Rangatiratanga and Kaitiakitanga: Different Ways of 
Viewing Land Entitlements in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 2 TE TAI HARURU: J. MAORI 
LEGAL WRITING 86, 93 (2006). 
7 W. Galvin, Māori Land Development with Particular Reference to Land 
Development at Poutu, Northland, 3 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 291, 292 (1978). 
8 Māori Land: Ownership and Management by Tangata Whenua, CMTY. LAW 
MANUAL ONLINE, http://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-2-
maori-land/what-this-chapter-covers-2/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
9 See Boast, supra note 3, at 555. 
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into the official “system” of ownership, without first relinquishing it 
to the government for it to be given back via Crown grant.  
 
A. Current Aotearoa New Zealand Land Ownership Structure 
Today, Aotearoa New Zealand land is divided into five 
general categories. The first is “general” land. The nature of this type 
of land is such that an individual holds title in fee simple, by grant of 
the Crown.10 The second is Crown land itself, which is simply land 
that has not been granted by the Crown to an individual owner.11 This 
category of land accounts for about half of Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
landmass.12 The third is the previously mentioned Māori freehold 
land, which is land that has been identified and brought under the 
Crown title system, but remains within the jurisdiction of the Māori 
Land Court.13 Māori freehold land is subject to a number of 
restrictions that make it more difficult to alienate or sell when 
compared to general land. Members of Māori communities that have 
relationships with the land (often called the “preferred class of 
alienees”) at issue are given the right of first refusal for purchases.14 
In the event that no one from the preferred class of alienees is 
interested and financially qualified, land may be sold to non-Māori, 
although the strong preference of the Māori Land Court is to protect 
and promote Māori ownership.15 These first three categories of land 
are based in the English common law system that was imposed in 
                                                 
10 Id. at 554. 
11 Id. at 555. 
12 Richard P. Boast, Property Rights and Public Law Traditions in New Zealand, 11 
N.Z. J. PUB. INT. L. 161, 180 (2013). 
13 Id. 
14 Alienation: Selling, Gifting, and other Transactions, CMTY. LAW MANUAL 
ONLINE, http://communitylaw.org.nz/community-law-manual/chapter-2-maori-
land/alienation-selling-gifting-and-other-land-transactions/restrictions-on-selling-
or-otherwise-alienating-maori-land/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
15 Māori Land and the Māori Land Court, CITIZENS ADVICE BUREAU, 
http://www.cab.org.nz/vat/hle/ml/Pages/MaoriLandCourt.aspx (last visited Mar. 3, 
2019). 
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Aotearoa New Zealand, by which the Crown had ultimate title to the 
land and individual title could only be derived through the Crown.16  
The fourth category of land is largely symbolic at this point, 
and that is land that remains under Māori customary title. This is land 
that has never been moved into the feudal system, and therefore has 
always remained under Māori “customary title,” without any 
intervention by the Crown.17 This land is no longer alienable 
according to the Te Ture Whenua Māori Act/Māori Land Act 1993.18 
The fifth category is the “foreshore and seabed” land, which 
comprises the common marine and coastland. This category of land 
was created by the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004. This land 
essentially belongs to no one.19 Although it is not owned by the 
Crown, this category of land can also be seen as having extinguished 
customary title.20 
The division of land into the above categories, particularly the large 
swaths of “general,” Crown-devised land and Crown land represents 
a lasting legacy of colonization in Aotearoa New Zealand.21 The 
settler-colonial anthropocentric view of land and property has become 
the prevailing regime in Aotearoa New Zealand.22 The supremacy of 
this system in Aotearoa New Zealand delivers a setting in which there 
is great conflict between Māori beliefs and attitudes towards land and 
the Aotearoa New Zealand government’s overarching approach.  
 
B.  Common Law Property Regimes 
English “possessory title” is the central organizing principle 
of Aotearoa New Zealand’s property law system.23 The “bundle of 
                                                 
16 See Shackell, supra note 6, at 94. 
17 Id. 
18 Te Ture Whenua Māori Act/Māori Land Act 1993, pt 7, c1 145 (N.Z.) (“No 
person has the capacity to alienate any interest in Māori customary land or to dispose 
by will of any such interest.”). 
19 Boast, supra note 12, at 167. 
20 Id. at 180. 
21 Elaine C. Hsiao, Whanganui River Agreement, 42 ENVTL. POL’Y & L. 371 (2012). 
22 Blair Keown, Ownership, Kaitiakitanga and Rangatiratanga in Aotearoa New 
Zealand, 2 TE TAI HARURU: J. MAORI LEGAL WRITING 66, 68 (2006). 
23 Id. at 74. 
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rights” afforded to property ownership in Aotearoa New Zealand’s 
common law system allows an owner to use, manage, enjoy, convey, 
and enjoy exclusive possession of property. The incidents of 
ownership that arise from current Aotearoa New Zealand property 
law include some things that come into direct conflict with the Māori 
worldview. Rights of land possession in Māori culture are based on 
ownership and use; under common law, rights of possession are based 
on deeds of sale.24 Therefore, if a system is to recognize that land can 
be owned, it must also generate a framework around which ownership 
can be managed, acquired, and controlled.25 These incidents of 
ownership are supported by Aotearoa New Zealand laws and further 
reflect that the settler-colonial attitudes towards land ownership are 
the entrenched principles upon which Aotearoa New Zealand 
property law is founded.26  
The key to property ownership in a common law system is the 
right to exclusive possession.27 This notion is strongly centered 
around the “individual” notions of property ownership, and 
protections for individual owners are supported by common law 
property actions such as trespass.28 The rights to income from 
property demonstrate the individual’s exploitative relationship with 
the land, whereby the owner confers an entitlement to resource use 
necessarily demonstrating the submission of the land to the 
individual.29 The use of resources is evidence of possession, as is the 
land’s characteristic of transmissibility,30 allowing the land to be 
passed in ownership from generation to generation. In Aotearoa New 
Zealand, the strength of individual property ownership is 
strengthened by the fact that land titles are guaranteed by the 
                                                 
24 Robert Joseph, Legal Challenges at the Interface of Māori Custom and State 
Regulatory Systems: Wāhi Tapu, 13-14 Y.B.N.Z. JURIS. (2010-2011). For more 
illustration of Māori and colonial attitudes to land, see Table 1. 
25 Shackell, supra note 6, at 89. 
26 Keown, supra note 22, at 68. 
27 Id. at 72. 
28 Boast, supra note 12, at 169. 
29 Keown, supra note 22, at 73. 
30 Id. 
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government.31 One responsibility that arises as an incident of 
ownership is the prohibition of harmful use.32 Ironically, this doesn’t 
have to do with harming the land itself (as one is entitled to vis-à-vis 
the incident of profit derivation), but with using one’s land to injure 
another. This involves avoiding breaking laws of nuisance and 
negligence, and mostly revolves around avoiding interference with 
the dominion of another individual over his or her own land. 
The colonial view of nature is generally anthropocentric, 
meaning that humans are generally considered to be supreme over 
nature,33 and revolves around “individual identity” and humans as the 
dominators of the natural world. Laws and property regimes reflect 
this supremacy, whereby individuals can hold complete dominion 
over land or natural resources. In this strain of thought, the land is 
only “good” insofar as it is useful to humans.34 In indigenous ways of 
knowing, however, there is a much more symbiotic or interdependent 
relationship with the land and natural world.  
The Māori worldview, more expansively known as Māori 
cosmology, centers on the “collective identity” where humans are but 
one element within a balanced and complex natural world, where all 
elements are connected through whakapapa, or genealogy.35 The 
concepts briefly detailed above, especially the ideas of exclusive 
possession and exploitation of natural resources, are absent from 
Māori worldviews.36 In most indigenous cultures, including the 
Māori, “property” regimes, insofar as they exist, treat ecological 
resources (including land, rivers, forests, etc.) as “intrinsically 
communal, intergenerational, and spiritually imbued with 
obligation.”37 The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
                                                 
31 Boast, supra note 12, at 172. 
32 Keown, supra note 22, at 73. 
33 Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes, Māori Cultural Rights in Aotearoa New Zealand: 
Protecting the Cosmology that Protects the Environment, 21 WIDENER L. REV. 273, 
275 (2015). 
34 Id. at 277. 
35 Jacinta Ruru, Indigenous Peoples’ Ownership and Management of Mountains: 
The Aoteatoa/New Zealand Experience, 3 INDIGENOUS L. J. 111, 114 (2004). 
36 Keown, supra note 22, at 77. 
37 MARY CHRISTINA WOOD, NATURE’S TRUST: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR A NEW 
ECOLOGICAL AGE 271 (Cambridge University Press 2014). 
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Peoples38 recognizes the important spiritual connection that 
indigenous people worldwide have with the land.39 This is 
specifically referenced in the document as an indigenous peoples’ 
right to “maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and 
used lands, territories, wasters and coastal seas and other resources.”40  
When different ideologies co-exist in the same physical space, 
they can either be held in equal regard, or one can yield to the other. 
In Aotearoa New Zealand, the settler-colonial common law notions 
of property and ownership have taken the dominant role, with the 
Māori worldview being forced into the submissive position.41 The 
concepts in Māori that come closest to describing the Western notion 
of ownership are themselves so multi-dimensional that the immediate 
removal of context by translation erases much of their meaning.42 
 
II. KAITIAKITANGA AND RANGATIRATANGA: CULTURAL 
CONCEPTS THAT “JUST DON’T TRANSLATE” 
Kaitiakitanga and rangatiratanga, which trace directly to 
spirituality elements, or wairua, are Māori  concepts that have 
difficulty existing authentically in a legal and property framework 
that was developed without them in mind. Kaitiakitanga is broadly 
defined as stewardship or guaradianship,43 and rangatiratanga is 
                                                 
38 The U.N. Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) was not 
originally supported by New Zealand, the United States, Canada, or Australia. The 
original adoption was supported by 144 countries, opposed by the four mentioned, 
with eleven countries abstaining. Since the original adoption in 2007, the four 
opposing countries have reversed their positions and now support UNDRIP. See 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UNITED NATIONS, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/declaration-on-the-
rights-of-indigenous-peoples.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
39 Michelle Bryan, Valuing Sacred Tribal Waters within Prior Appropriation, 57 
NAT. RES. J. 139, 143 (2017). 
40 G.A. Res. 61/295, Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Sept. 13, 
2007). 
41 Keown, supra note 22, at 67. 
42 Id. at 70. 
43 Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 281. 
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broadly defined as self-determination or sovereignty.44 The terms are 
multi-dimensional and their richness only develops in their 
appropriate context; however, the government of Aotearoa New 
Zealand recognizes the importance of incorporating these concepts 
into formal legal systems. Blair Keown describes settler-colonial 
common law property ownership as a blanket, with kaitiakitanga and 
rangatiratanga only able to exist in places where the blanket has holes 
or provides no cover.45 The largest difference between rangatiratanga 
and ownership is that ownership simply involves an individual’s 
rights, where rangatiratanga is a part of the collective group’s 
authority, interests, and rights.46 The key element of kaitiakitanga that 
differentiates it from ownership is that it has a spiritual quality at its 
core.47 In the Māori worldview, the land gives and sustains life, and 
kaitiakitanga represents the obligation that humans hold in return.  
The concept of rangatiratanga refers to the right of self-
determination and sovereignty. This interpretation is based in the idea 
that indigenous peoples were autonomous before colonialism and are 
entitled to rights and recognition as self-governing.48 This 
interpretation is also supported by the Waitangi Tribunal, who 
considers the term in the context of indigenous self-management, as 
opposed to entirely separate sovereignty.49 Even though it is 
expressed in the Treaty of Waitangi, the concept of rangatiratanga has 
always been a point of contention for Māori-Crown relations. The 
English and Māori versions of the Treaty of Waitangi are internally 
inconsistent with regard to sovereignty. Article I of the English 
version provides for the termination of sovereignty to the Crown, 
while Article II of the Māori version provides for rangatiratanga over 
their land, resources, and people.50 The Māori version seems to 
                                                 
44 Keown, supra note 22, at 75. 
45 Id. at 66. 
46 Shackell, supra note 6, at 93. 
47 Id. at 91. 
48 Andrew Erueti, Māori Rights to Freshwater: The Three Conceptual Models of 
Indigenous Rights, 24 WAIKATO L. REV. 58, 60 (2016). 
49 WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, REPORT OF THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL ON THE 
MURIWHENUA FISHING CLAIM 187 (1988). 
50 Erueti, supra note 48, at 63. 
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anticipate power-sharing, where the English version presumes the 
Crown has absolute sovereignty. The English version extinguishes 
broad Māori rights to self-determination and bases that presumption 
in the original “giving up” of Māori independence to the Crown. 
Because of the difference in the two versions of the Treaty, the 
concept of rangatiratanga has been relegated to only applying where 
land is under Māori legal control – an idea that is incompatible with 
a Māori worldview.51 
The concept of kaitiakitanga, on the other hand, does not 
directly conflict with the settler-colonial notion of ownership.52 
Kaitiakitanga is broadly defined as guardianship or stewardship, but 
these simple explanations again remove the notion from its complex 
context by trying to plug in feudal English notions. The notion of 
kaitiakitanga involves the interaction between the whakapapa 
(genealogical connection to the land) and the whanaungatanga (multi-
dimensional relationships with the land).53 The relationship described 
by kaitiakitanga can involve individuals but also spirits of the dead. 
All humans are spiritually connected as kaitiaki, or guardians of the 
land.54 Guardianship and stewardship do not necessarily capture the 
“broader intangible notions of spiritual integrity, restoration of mana 
and maintenance of sacred relationships,” but they are together the 
closest analogous English terms and together represent how 
kaitiakitanga has been understood in the Aotearoa New Zealand legal 
context.55 The seeming incompatibility of these Māori concepts and 
the English common law property regime which dominates much of 
Aotearoa New Zealand provides an opportunity for the country to 
adopt a novel approach to land management, one that would show 
respect for Māori cosmologies while practically addressing 
environmental concerns. 
  
                                                 
51 Keown, supra note 22, at 76. 
52 Id. at 79. 
53 Id. at 80. 
54 Christopher Rodgers, A New Approach to Protecting Ecosystems: The Te Awa 
Tupua (Whanganui River Claims Settlement) Act 2017, 19 ENVTL. L. REV. 266, 270 
(2017). 
55 Keown, supra note 22, at 81. 
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III. The Movement for Personhood for Natural Objects in Aotearoa 
New Zealand 
The idea of granting legal personhood to natural objects, 
resources, and formations arises from the work of American law 
professor Christopher D. Stone. In his seminal article Should Trees 
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, Stone lays 
out what he calls the “legal-operational aspects” and the “socio-
psychic aspects” of granting personhood to natural objects.56 The 
central concern addressed by Stone’s proposed framework was the 
inability of an anthropocentric legal system to fully protect our 
planet’s natural resources.57 According to Stone, in order to truly have 
legal rights, an object’s autonomy must meet the following three 
criteria: the thing must be able to create legal actions, any injury to it 
must be considered in the determination of relief, and the relief must 
be to the benefit of the thing.58 Without these three criteria, a natural 
object does not have what could be considered legal rights in and of 
themselves. There is a fourth, albeit more indirect criterion: that there 
is a public authority empowered to review actions that interfere with 
these rights. 
 With particular attention to the first three criteria, it seems 
obvious that the common law property regime in Aotearoa New 
Zealand is incompatible with a personhood model for natural objects. 
However, Aotearoa New Zealand has illustrated and codified a 
national commitment to incorporating Māori cosmologies into its 
legal system where practical, and this idea of granting personhood has 
been undertaken with respect to two natural objects: Te Urewera (a 
former national park) and Te Awa Tupua (the face of the Whanganui 
River). 
In Aotearoa New Zealand, the act of “granting” personhood 
to natural objects demonstrates opposing views of natural objects. 
From the point of view of Parliament, granting personhood is a 
concession. From the point of view of Māori, achieving personhood 
                                                 
56 Christopher D. Stone, Should Trees Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for 
Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450, 458 (1972). 
57 Philippe Sands, On Being 40: A Celebration of Should Trees Have Standing, 3 J. 
HUMAN RIGHTS. & ENV’T. 2 (2012). 
58 Stone, supra note 56, at 458. 
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is much closer to a recognition of the inherent characteristics of the 
natural objects. For Māori, the Parliamentary action is simply a legal 
declaration of what they have always known to be true, that the 
natural objects are ancestors regardless of their legal status.59 While 
it is true that this vesting of title does not necessarily perfectly reflect 
traditional Māori concepts, it is the tool that is available today, within 
the current property and legal regime.60 
The question that remains is this: how does granting 
personhood to natural objects address the incongruities between 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s common law “bundle of rights” approach to 
property law, and the Māori cosmological view of property, 
incorporating concepts such as rangatiratanga and kaitiakitanga? 
Specifically, does the enacted legislation in Aotearoa New Zealand, 
relating to the personhood of Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua, address 
these incongruities?  
 
A.  Te Urewera Act 2014 
 Te Urewera was the largest national park on the North Island 
of Aotearoa New Zealand. Despite its longstanding classification as 
a national park, Te Urewera is the ancestral land of the Tūhoe iwi,61 
who have a deep spiritual connection to it as their homeland.62 Unlike 
the Whanganui, party to the Te Awa Tupua Act discussed below, the 
Tūhoe never signed the Treaty of Waitangi. The Tūhoe actually 
entered into a separate agreement with the Crown, known as the 
Urewera Agreement, however, this agreement (along with many 
others signed by other iwi) have been largely forgotten in the 
“myopic” focus on the Treaty of Waitangi as the fulcrum of Crown-
Māori relations.63 The Tūhoe’s partial motivation for abstaining from 
                                                 
59 Gwendolyn J. Gordon, Environmental Personhood, 43 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 49, 
86 (2018). 
60 Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 317. 
61 The modern meaning of "iwi" is tribe. Traditionally, it refers more generally to a 
“set of people bound together by descent from a common ancestor or ancestors; 
literally: bone”. See Glossary, TE ARA: THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEW ZEALAND, 
https://teara.govt.nz/en/glossary#iwi (last visited Mar. 3, 2019). 
62 Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 318. 
63 Hannah Blumhardt, Multi-Textualism, Treaty Hegemony and the Waitangi 
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the Treaty of Waitangi was their wish to retain absolute sovereignty 
with no Crown intervention in their lands.64 Tūhoe lands were 
transferred to Crown ownership through a combination of 
confiscation and purchase, whereby the Crown consolidated 
thousands of small plots into the swath that became Te Urewera 
National Park.65 This ultimately became the underpinning of the legal 
battle for personhood of Te Urewera, which began with an inquiry by 
the Waitangi Tribunal and ended with a negotiated settlements 
process; a settlement agreement signed by the Tūhoe and the Crown; 
and legislation brought to Parliament.66 The Tūhoe argued that only 
the restoration of their traditional relationship with the land would 
allow them to adequately exercise their guardianship responsibilities, 
or kaitiakitanga.67 Initially, this meant that the Tūhoe sought to 
transfer title directly to the iwi, as this was the only remedy available 
“within the system.” The Crown, however, was not amenable to this 
option and instead offered to grant the park legal personality. In this 
respect, the park would vest title to itself, and would be governed 
differently than Crown-owned land.68 Some have seen this remedy as 
a bit of a work-around for the Crown in order to avoid any remedy 
that would truly restore full rights to the Tūhoe iwi. 
 The explicit objectives of the Te Urewera Act include 
provisions for the management of the spiritual aspects of the land. 
This is known as the “mana me mauri,” the “sense of the sensitive 
perception of a living and spiritual force in a place.”69 Operationally, 
the management of Te Urewera involves a Board, with a much larger 
body than the analogous body in Te Awa Tupua.70 The Board is 
established to “act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera” and 
                                                 
Tribunal: Making Sense of the 19th Century Crown-Māori Negotiations in Te 
Urewera, 43 VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 263, 264 (2012). 
64 Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 319. 
65 WAITANGI TRIBUNAL, WAITANGI TRIBUNAL REPORT 50 (2015).  
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“to provide governance for Te Urewera.”71 The Board is likewise 
required to consider Tūhoe tradition and provide for the relationship 
of the iwi and Te Urewera. While there are some similarities between 
the Te Urewera Act and legislation that dictates the operations of 
Aotearoa New Zealand’s national parks, the Te Urewera Act marks 
the first time that land has been removed from the umbrella of 
national park legislation.72 The Act demonstrates a “bi-cultural” 
approach to the land – recognizing both its environmental importance 
(through specific provisions relating to preservation, similar to the 
protections provided in the previous national parks legislation) and its 
cultural importance (through language specifically referring to the 
Tūhoe relationship).73 The Act itself incorporates many Māori 
language terms, some without translation whatsoever. Including 
Māori terms in this manner has the goal of upholding the actual 
concept itself, as opposed to an English translation of a foreign 
cultural concept. 
 
B.  Te Awa Tupua Act 2017 
The Whanganui iwi has been fighting with the government of 
Aotearoa New Zealand for the recognition of their relationship with 
the Whanganui River since 1873,74 making it the longest running 
litigation over Māori land claims in Aotearoa New Zealand history.75 
The battle has centered around the Crown’s mistreatment of the river 
and its surrounds, including stripping minerals and diverting its 
source waters for hydroelectric power.76 The end of the battle, 
culminating in the Te Awa Tupua Act recognizing the personhood for 
the river, represents a movement towards decolonization of land and 
                                                 
71 Iorns Magallanes, supra note 33, at 322. 
72 Jacinta Ruru, Tuhoe-Crown settlement – Te Urewera Act 2014, 1 MĀORI L. REV., 
1, 2 (2014). 
73 Id. at 3. 
74 Marcello B. Rodriguez Ferrere, New Zealand – Wanganui river becomes a 
‘person’, P.L., 524, 524 (Jul. 2017). 
75 Rodgers, supra note 54, at 266. 
76 Rodriguez Ferrere, supra note 74, at 524. 
2019]  171 
 
marks an assertion of rights and decision-making over their ancestral 
lands.77  
Te Awa Tupua as a living being encompasses the entire 
Whanganui River, from the mountains and tributaries to the sea.78 To 
the Whanganui, the river is their ancestor,79 and the agreement 
incorporates this geneological approach (whakapapa) to describing 
the river.80 The Māori saying “ko au te awa, ko te awa ko au,” 
meaning “I am the river, the river is me,” became one of the 
fundamental principles of the final negotiation.81  
The predecessor agreement to the Te Awa Tupua Act was the 
Record of Understanding in Relation to Whanganui River Settlement 
and was signed by the Whanganui iwi and the Crown as an interim 
agreement in 2011. This Record of Understanding expressed 
principles that would carry through into the final agreement. Among 
other things, it seemed to honor the relationship between the river and 
the Whanganui iwi by recognizing the interconnected nature of the 
iwi’s sovereignty with that of the river, as well and the reciprocal 
nature of the “health and well-being” of the iwi and the river.82 The 
explicit objectives of the final legislation include the goals of 
recognizing, promoting, and protecting the health and well-being of 
the river and its status as Te Awa Tupua.83 The agreement also agrees 
to recognize and provide for mana (roughly meaning honor, prestige, 
and respect) and support the relationship of the Whanganui with the 
river (te mana o te iwi).84 
The Act returned the riverbed to the river itself, not to the iwi. 
While vesting title in the iwi would have been a step in the right 
direction of acknowledging the sovereignty of the river, the creation 
of the autonomous entity of Te Awa Tupua recognizes the complete 
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and indivisible qualities of the river in its entirety. The river itself no 
longer can be owned – representing a complete break from common 
law principles.85 “Te Awa Tupua is a legal person and has all the 
rights, powers, duties, and liabilities of a legal person.”86 
Te Pou Tupua is the name of the office which operates as the 
“human face” of the river’s personality and can interact on behalf of 
the river and is responsible for protecting the river and promoting its 
interests. The office consists of two (human) persons “of high 
standing,”87 one nominated by the iwi having interests in the river and 
one nominated by the Crown.88 Te Pou Tupua has an obligation to 
uphold the tupua te kawa, which is the concept encompassing the 
physical and spiritual aspects of the river. The Crown provided NZD 
$30 million in a grant to help fund the Te Pou Tupua and support it in 
its mission. This operates as a sort of public trust,89 with the trustees 
in Te Pou Tupua acting as the “human face” of Te Awa Tupua. 
 
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE PERSONHOOD IDENTITY FOR MĀORI 
 The clear implication of the new framework under which Te 
Urewera and Te Awa Tupua exist is that there is now the recognition 
of a very different overall idea of property when compared to the 
common law tradition.90 Te Urewera and Te Awa Tupua no longer 
exist in the British, settler-colonial, common law context in that 
individuals may no longer own or claim property rights to them. On 
the surface, it seems as though these “concessions” by the Crown are 
only for the benefit of the Māori whose kinship with their natural 
objects has been validated and absolutely benefit from the formal 
recognition of their ancestral relationships. As Blair Keown states, “A 
truly integrated system of property rights appears problematic and 
perhaps unachievable. However, the Tiriti obligation of good faith 
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and the notion of partnership inherent in our nation’s founding 
document have provided an opportunity for rigorous and potentially 
fruitful political dialogue between the Māori and the Crown.”91 As 
this paper addresses below, there are likely some additional benefits 
derived from these Acts and others that may follow them. Two 
centuries of title-driven property ownership and common law 
practices have resulted in some challenges – particularly for 
environmental protection – that these new approaches could 
potentially address, to the benefit of the whole of Aotearoa New 
Zealand.  
 
A.  Recognition of Ancestral Nature of Land and Natural Objects 
The Māori understanding of land as an ancestor differs from 
the interdependent relationship described below. The recognition of 
humans as descended from the rest of the natural world is pervasive 
in indigenous creation stories, and Māori culture does not tend to 
separate the spiritual from the physical when considering the natural 
world.92 The Whanganui iwi, for example, recognize the Whanganui 
river itself as their ancestor, and see Te Awa Tupua as a being, 
inseparable from the iwi.93 Likewise, the Tūhoe describe Te Urewera 
as “their place of origin and return,” and have always held a deep 
spiritual attachment to the land, even throughout the six decades it 
classified as a national park.94 
The Te Awa Tupua Whanganui River Claims Settlement Act 
2017 contains the following language in recognition of the ancestral 
nature of Te Awa Tupua:  
 
Ko au te Awa, ko te Awa ko au: I am the River and the 
River is me: 
The iwi and hapū of the Whanganui River have an 
inalienable connection 
with, and responsibility to, Te Awa Tupua and its 
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health and wellbeing.95 
 
This language, among other language in the Act, formalizes into law 
not only the relationship between the iwi and Te Awa Tupua, but the 
importance of the relationship – signaling its symbiotic nature and the 
presence of kaitiakitanga. 
 The Te Urewera Act 2014 uses even more esoteric language 
to explain the relationship between the Tūhoe and the land now 
legally known as Te Urewera: 
 
For Tūhoe, Te Urewera is Te Manawa o te Ika a Māui; 
it is the 
heart of the great fish of Maui, its name being derived 
from 
Murakareke, the son of the ancestor Tūhoe.96 
 
Beyond the description of the land as the “heart of the great fish of 
Maui,” a description earned through the mythological tale of the 
demigod Maui “fishing up” the North Island with his hook,97 the Act 
also refers to Te Urewera as “prized by all New Zealanders as a place 
of outstanding national value and intrinsic worth.”98 This inclusion of 
Te Urewera’s importance to all of New Zealand seems to give even 
more credence to the relationship with the iwi, not only because it 
comes chronologically after the description of the Tūhoe relationship, 
but because it signals a level of trust in the iwi’s caretaking. 
Although the language from the Acts formally recognizes the 
inalienable nature of the connection between the iwi and Te Urewera 
and Te Awa Tupua, the vesting of legal title in the name of the entities 
themselves is still somewhat problematic vis-à-vis Māori traditions.99 
Put simply, “indigenous cultural property transcends the classic legal 
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concepts of markets, title, and alienability that we often associate with 
ownership.”100  
 
B.  Symbiosis, not Supremacy 
The differences between the ways that settler states and 
indigenous populations view their relationship with natural elements 
are the basis for disputes between the two regarding use of land and 
natural resources. The indigenous “cosmologies,” which include 
protective views of the environment, are in constant conflict with the 
settlor governments by which they are bound.101 Settler-colonialists 
arrived in Aotearoa New Zealand with a particularly individualistic 
interpretation of property rights – humans had authority over nature 
and were entitled to do as they pleased in the interest of personal or 
corporate gain.102 
Kaitiakitanga is the obligation to nurture and provide care. 
While it is roughly translated as stewardship, this does not fully 
incorporate the spiritual element that instills in Māori a responsibility 
to and of their community.103 The kaitiaki relationship is not 
transactional and does not involve any elements of ownership. 
Additionally, the Māori term whanaungatanga roughly translates to 
kinship and refers to a wide network of people, land, water, animals, 
plants, and spirits.104 In this sense, humans might be the guardians of 
nature, but they are not above or below any other element in the 
whanaungatanga. 
 The systems devised to facilitate these relationships with the 
land, codified by the Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts, function 
differently. The “human face” of Te Awa Tupua, known as Te Pou 
Tupua, consists of two individual trustees, one nominated by the iwi 
having interests in the Whanganui River and one nominated on behalf 
of the Crown (the first of these Crown appointments is to be 
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nominated by the Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations and 
all subsequent nominations are to be made by the Minister for the 
Environment).105 The functions of Te Pou Tupua are to “act and speak 
for and on behalf of Te Awa Tupua,” and Te Pou Tupua “must act in 
the interests of Te Awa Tupua.”106 
 The governance of Te Urewera, on the other hand, consists 
of the Te Urewera Board, which consists of members appointed by 
both the governing body of the Tūhoe, the Tūhoe Te Uru Taumatua, 
and members appointed by the Minister of the Environment and the 
Minister for Treaty of Waitangi Negotiations.107 Interestingly, the 
balance of the appointees shifts as time passes. In the first three years 
after the settlement date, the Board is to consist of an even split of 
appointees from both the iwi and the Crown, totaling eight members. 
However, after the third anniversary of the settlement, the Board 
shifts to a total of nine members, made up of six iwi appointees and 
three Crown appointees.108 Much like the charges of the Te Pou 
Tupua, the Te Urewera Board’s purpose as stated in the Act are “to 
act on behalf of, and in the name of, Te Urewera; and to provide 
governance for Te Urewera in accordance with this Act.”109 When 
making decisions, the Board must “consider and provide 
appropriately for the relationship of iwi and hapū and their culture and 
traditions with Te Urewera.”110 
 While the respective Acts vary in drafting style, the rights and 
responsibilities given to the governing bodies are relatively the same. 
However, the Te Urewera Board’s structure seems to be a sharper 
reflection of the concept of kaitiakitanga. While the Act charges the 
Board with pursuit of unanimous decision-making, and requires it in 
some cases,111 there is some flexibility for consensus decision-
making.112 Because of the numerical breakdown of the Board, which 
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is to consist of two-thirds majority Tūhoe appointees, decisions that 
may be made by vote (if consensus cannot be achieved) would 
seemingly go in favor of the Tūhoe members.  
The question becomes, in the context of complex legislation 
and management schemes involving human guardians, whether laws 
that afford rights to humans over nature really resolve the issue of 
affording rights to nature itself. Does dissolving ownership by 
humans in favor of a board of appointed humans really disaggregate 
the natural object from humankind? While this is likely the closest 
available legal option at this point in time,113 there is also some Māori-
focused justification for the involvement of humans in the 
management. According to Catherine J. Iorns Magallanes: 
 
The appointment of a body to be an official guardian 
recognises “the inseparability” of the people and the 
river or forest, respectively, as well as the 
responsibilities inherent in that relationship for taking 
care of them as kin. In this sense, these examples 
emphasise the responsibilities to nature more than 
nature’s rights. But it is certainly possible to place this 
within a framework that emphasises nature's rights, 
viewing the responsibilities as the flip side of the 
human duties within a legal system that recognises 
these rights.114 
 
V. UPSCALING ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS, OVERCOMING 
SHORTFALLS IN COMMON LAW PROPERTY SYSTEMS 
The Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts were created in 
order to recognize and show respect to the Māori cosmologies, not for 
environmental protection reasons.115 However, the idea of 
personhood for natural formations and objects has its birthplace in 
environmental protection. As stated earlier, the originator of the idea 
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of environmental personhood was Christopher D. Stone, who 
introduced the idea in the Southern California Law Review in 1972. 
Therefore, the concept theoretically can go beyond the importance of 
recognizing Māori relationships with the land. As Stone laid out in 
his article, there are clearly links between the legal personality 
concept and the goal of environmental protection.  
Addressing issues of environmental protection is one of the 
problems that arise from two centuries of title-driven property 
ownership and common law practices. These Acts, in unifying “title” 
to natural formations, may address this issue to the benefit of the 
whole of Aotearoa New Zealand, not just Māori. The fallout from 
title-driven property regimes, which focus on individual ownership, 
is that they are often too narrow of a scope for true environmental 
protections.116 English common law is focused on exclusive rights 
and protecting private property, which often means that it doesn’t 
allow for strategic planning or large-scale protections. In order to 
provide the environmental protections that will benefit the entire 
population of Aotearoa New Zealand, there needs to be a broader 
approach. This means that some mechanism must facilitate planning 
and execution at the landscape or ecosystem scale in order to 
effectively plan conservation and protective programs.117  
Both the Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts place emphasis 
on the protection of nature itself, as opposed to the personal rights of 
individual property owners. This is important in that they essentially 
recognize the intrinsic value of nature standing alone, not just in its 
context of usefulness to people.118 Most environmental legislation 
today balances interests between protection of nature and use or 
access by humans. By focusing on the protection of nature itself, the 
Te Awa Tupua and Te Urewera Acts provide examples of 
frameworks “in which the ‘environment’ is seen not as a disparate 
collection of property entitlements with special attributes, but instead 
as a collective whole, a living entity which incorporates all of the 
physical and metaphysical elements of each ecosystem.”119 
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Stone identified four criteria which should be met in order for 
the concept of legal rights to truly be achieved. First, the thing must 
be able to create legal actions; second, any injury to it must be 
considered in the determination of relief; third, the relief must be to 
the benefit of the thing; fourth and more indirectly, there should be a 
public authority empowered to review anything that interferes with 
these rights.120 Focusing on the first three, the Te Awa Tupua and Te 
Urewera Acts as written provide examples for frameworks that 
address each of the issues in the context of the title-driven, common 
law legal regimes that create them. 
 
A.  Legal Standing 
One of the main criteria for the validation of legal rights is the 
ability to institute legal action. At common law, a natural object has 
no such right. In order for there to be a suit against the polluter of a 
stream in a common law system, the individual owners of individual 
parcels of land must demonstrate injury. While the overall damage to 
the stream may be substantial, the individual damage may or may not 
be adequate to sustain a suit against the polluter. Regardless, the rights 
that are honored by the courts are the rights of the owners of the 
individual parcels of the stream not to be injured by another private 
entity – the stream itself has no standing to protect itself.121 
The issue of legal standing is a problem for environmental 
justice everywhere.122 In common law property regimes, the problem 
of establishing sufficient interest in an environmental dispute often 
blocks claims from court.123 Typically, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
harm to property or a commercial interest and satisfy close proximity 
tests.124 While Aotearoa New Zealand has historically set a liberal 
standard for legal standing in environmental cases,125 especially 
where there has been a community impact or damage to natural 
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resources, there still remains the issue that one natural object – a 
forest, for example—could consist of several different types of 
property, all which are managed differently and are under the 
jurisdiction of different courts (“general” land vs. Crown land vs. 
Māori freehold vs. customary title). 
When it comes to legal standing, both Acts address the matter. 
The Te Awa Tupua Act begins the description of Te Awa Tupua’s 
legal status by declaring that Te Awa Tupua has all the rights, powers, 
duties, and liabilities of a legal person.126 The Te Awa Tupua Act 
imbues the Whanganui River with ‘legal standing in its own right.” 
127 The Te Urewera Act’s statement of purpose begins in the 
following way: “The purpose of this Act is to establish and preserve 
in perpetuity a legal identity and protected status for Te Urewera”128 
By establishing a legal identity for Te Urewera, Parliament has 
imbued the land with the ability to enforce its own legal rights (and 
to be subject to enforcement of its duties).129 
 
B.  Injury and Benefits to the Natural Object 
From an environmental protection perspective, the main goal 
of bestowing legal personality on a natural object is to protect that 
object, whether it be a forest, a river, or an ecosystem, from injury. 
The main issue with title-driven and common law property regimes, 
on this matter, is defining what injury means. Stone argues that one 
approach to measuring damages to the environment, which is 
currently implausible under individual ownership regimes, is by 
determining the “cost of making the environment whole.”130 While 
he expresses reservations about quantifying what could otherwise be 
considered priceless,131 he does consider including considerations 
such as pain and suffering and future costs into the calculations.132 
There are also concerns about dealing with environmental interests 
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that some would consider useless, such as certain species of 
commercially-valueless inedible fish.133 Calculating damages from 
the river’s perspective could involve examining the costs associated 
with restocking, which would be difficult for any individual other 
than the river itself to justify. Another form of protection available to 
the natural resources is injunctive relief, whereby the resource or 
object can itself be a party.134 By granting legal personality to Te Awa 
Tupua and Te Urewera, Parliament has given the governing bodies 
the ability to sue on behalf of the natural formations themselves, with 
the natural formations as parties and therefore beneficiaries of any 
potential awards. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The concept of legal personality for land and natural objects 
addresses many points of difference between English common law 
concepts of property and Māori notions of kinship with and 
stewardship of ancestral lands. While the idea of legal personality was 
conceived by an American law professor as a path to environmental 
protections, it found its way to Aotearoa New Zealand as a way to 
recognize Māori rights and relationships to the natural world.135 
Although the two major implementations of this concept, the 
Whanganui River/Te Awa Tupua Act and the Te Urewera National 
Park/Te Urewera Act, were conceived in order to bolster Māori 
cosmologies, they provide frameworks for and examples of how this 
concept could be used to provide environmental protections in parts 
of the world still restricted by common law notions of property 
ownership. 
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